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Non-Technical Summary
Each year over three thousand R&D projects in more than two thousand
firms received public grants from the German Federal Government. However, the
number of subsidized firms does not reveal, whether it is always the same group
of companies that receive funding, or whether the beneficiaries change over time.
Understanding the temporal structure of subsidy distribution could help future
research explain the effects and effectiveness of subsidies. In the face of shrinking
government budgets and intensified international competition in the field of tech-
nology, knowing and increasing the efficiency of innovation policies has become
crucial.
The focus is set on a specific public support scheme, the German Federal
Government’s non-defense R&D project funding scheme (DPF). This is the most
important tool used by the German government to fund R&D in private busi-
nesses. In 2005, firms received over 700 million euros under this scheme. The
importance of this funding scheme will increase in Germany in the coming years
since it is the main distribution channel for the new High-Tech strategy launched
by the Federal Government (BMBF, 2006b).
The aim of this paper is to analyze the structure of the firms receiving R&D
subsidies over time. In particular, I tackle the question of whether the same
firms enjoy subsidies over time. There is still very little empirical evidence on the
dynamics of firms’ participation in public funding schemes. In order to investi-
gate the persistence of funding it is necessary to distinguish between two types
of persistence. One is simply due to the fact that funded projects may run for
more than one calendar year. The other is due to newly approved projects. In
the DPF scheme, approved projects last on average for about three years.
The empirical part of this paper is based on an annual innovation survey,
the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). This is merged
with the DPF database in order to identify a firm’s subsidy status in each year.
The sample consists of over 6,000 different firms covering the manufacturing and
knowledge-intensive service sectors over the time period from 1994 to 2004.
Transition rates are calculated which describe the participation in the DPF
scheme between two periods in a univariate context. The share of innovating
firms which enter the funding scheme is extremely low. But if a firm has made
it into the DPF scheme, the probability of getting subsidies for new projects in
the following year is higher than that of dropping out of the scheme. Overall,
participation in the funding scheme is found to be quite stable.
The multivariate analysis also shows that for the probability of getting new
projects approved for the funding scheme, experience in the same scheme mat-
ters, beyond the subsidy status in the preceding year. In order to enter the DPF
scheme, experience with other subsidy programs is also helpful. At the same
time, it is important to control for the overall supply of subsidies. In addition,
large firms are more successful in receiving funding for new projects. Thus the
evidence cannot confirm that the scheme is achieving the government’s aim of
supporting SMEs in particular. The hypotheses that firms with higher knowledge
capabilities are more likely to enter and stay in the scheme can be supported as
I found positive impacts of R&D activities and human capital.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze (Summary in German)
In den meisten OECD-La¨ndern fo¨rdert der Staat Forschungsaktivita¨ten der
Unternehmen, um damit die Innovationskraft und Wettbewerbsfa¨higkeit zu
sta¨rken. In Deutschland ist das wichtigste Instrument des Bundes fu¨r die fi-
nanzielle Fo¨rderung von FuE-Ta¨tigkeiten in der Wirtschaft die direkte Projekt-
fo¨rderung (DPF). Diese Maßnahme fo¨rdert im Rahmen von Fachprogrammen
FuE-Projekte mittels nicht zuru¨ckzahlbarer Zuschu¨sse, die in bestimmten
Schlu¨sseltechnologien angesiedelt sind. Im Rahmen der DPF werden jedes Jahr
u¨ber 3.000 FuE-Projekte in u¨ber 2.000 Unternehmen gefo¨rdert. 2005 erhielten
die Unternehmen auf diesem Wege u¨ber 700 Millionen Euro. Die DPF gewinnt
durch die Hightech Strategie des Bundes weiter an Bedeutung.
Informationen u¨ber die Anzahl der gefo¨rderten Unternehmen geben jedoch
noch keinen Aufschluss u¨ber die Struktur der Zuwendungsempfa¨nger im Zeitver-
lauf, d.h. ob die Zusammensetzung der gefo¨rderten Unternehmen eine hohe Dy-
namik aufweist. Aber gerade die zeitliche Struktur spielt unter Umsta¨nden eine
wichtige Rolle bei der Beurteilung der Auswirkungen der Fo¨rderung.
Daher ist das Ziel dieser Studie, die Teilnahme der Unternehmen an der DPF
hinsichtlich der zeitlichen Struktur empirisch zu analysieren. Die Untersuchung
basiert auf dem Mannheimer Innovationspanel, einer ja¨hrlich durchgefu¨hrten In-
novationserhebung. Dieser Datensatz wurde mit Informationen der DPF-Daten-
bank erga¨nzt, um den Fo¨rderstatus der Unternehmen in jedem Jahr zu identi-
fizieren. Der Datensatz fu¨r die Untersuchung besteht aus u¨ber 6.000 verschiede-
nen Unternehmen aus dem Verarbeitendem Gewerbe und Dienstleistungssektor.
Im ersten Schritt werden U¨bergangswahrscheinlichkeiten berechnet, die die
Teilnahme der Unternehmen an der DPF in zwei aufeinander folgenden Jahren
beschreiben. Dabei erweist sich der Anteil der Unternehmen, die neu an der
DPF teilnehmen, als extrem klein. Wenn jedoch ein Unternehmen bereits an der
DPF partizipiert, ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit ho¨her, weiterhin neu gefo¨rderte Pro-
jekte zu bekommen, als aus der Fo¨rderung auszuscheiden. Insgesamt kann die
Teilnahme an der Maßnahme als recht stabil beurteilt werden. Die darauf auf-
bauende multivariate Untersuchung zeigt ferner, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit ein
neues Projekt genehmigt zu bekommen, nicht nur vom Fo¨rderstatus im vorherge-
henden Jahr abha¨ngig ist, sondern mit der Erfahrung insgesamt im Programm
steigt. Um an der DPF zu partizipieren, spielt auch die Erfahrung mit anderen
Fo¨rdermaßnahmen eine positive Rolle. Außerdem sind große Unternehmen er-
folgreicher neu an der DPF teilzunehmen und auch weitere Projekte gefo¨rdert
zu bekommen. Die Hypothese, dass Unternehmen mit besseren Fa¨higkeiten in
Bezug auf Wissenserzeugung und -management mit einer ho¨heren Wahrschein-
lichkeit neu und auch la¨nger an der DPF teilnehmen, kann besta¨tigt werden, da
FuE-Aktivita¨ten und Humankapital jeweils einen positiven Einfluss ausu¨ben.
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Abstract
The question of the allocation of public R&D funding is becoming par-
ticularly important when it comes to identifying the effects of state
subsidies, in terms of input or output additionality. This analysis goes
one important step further than the existing literature by including
the time dimension. Using firm-level data on German manufacturing
and knowledge-intensive service firms, this paper sheds light on the
structure of the subsidy recipients over time. It turns out that partic-
ipation in the funding scheme is quite stable. This is also confirmed
by applying a multivariate approach. Firms having received funding
in the past are more likely to be selected for public funding again. It
is also important to control for the overall supply of subsidies. Be-
sides, a firm’s size and knowledge capabilities increase the probability
of entering the scheme.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Each year over three thousand R&D projects in more than two thousand firms
received public grants from the German Federal Government.2 However, the
number of subsidized firms does not reveal, whether it is always the same group
of companies that receive funding, or whether the beneficiaries change over time.
A first question which arises is how the public subsidies are allocated across firms
over time.
The question of the allocation of public R&D funding across firms takes on
a particular importance when it comes to identifying the microeconomic effects
of subsidies with respect to input or output additionality. In order to answer
the question appropriately, a potential bias needs to be controlled for. Many
studies begin by determining a firm’s probability of receiving a subsidy. For this
purpose it is necessary to know in detail how specific schemes allocate subsidies
in practice. Understanding the temporal structure of subsidy distribution could
help future research explain the effects and effectiveness of subsidies. In the face
of shrinking government budgets and intensified international competition in the
field of technology, knowing and increasing the efficiency of innovation policies
has become crucial.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the structure of the firms receiving R&D
subsidies over time. There is still very little empirical evidence on the dynam-
ics of firms’ participation in public funding schemes. In the empirical literature
there are several studies which include an analysis of firms’ subsidy participation.
However there are only a few papers which consider the subsidies over time, by
at least controlling for the experience of applying for or receiving public awards.
These are the studies by Feldman and Kelley (2001), Duguet (2004), Gonza´lez,
Jaumandreu and Pazo´ (2005), and Tanayama (2007). Overall, it seems that firm’s
subsidy histories have an impact on obtaining awards in the future.
A lot of subsidy programs are available on the regional, national and Euro-
pean level which might have different allocation rules due to different goals and
eligibility criteria. Thus, it is important to distinguish in the analysis between
these programs. This means an analysis should concentrate on one specific pro-
gramme in order to get useful results.3 The focus on specific funding schemes
is lacking in most empirical studies. Often data from firms subsidized under a
number of different schemes are examined. Another issue is the length of the pe-
riod over which a single award is distributed to a firm. Since subsidies are often
granted for projects that run over several years the persistence of subsidies will
2Own calculations based on the PROFI database. The database is described in section 4.
3Blanes and Busom (2004) found differences between the participating firms in national and
regional programs.
1 INTRODUCTION 2
be over-estimated if this fact is not taken into account. I extend the literature
by considering these two issues in this study.
This analysis goes one important step further than the existing empirical lit-
erature by focussing on the time dimension. The focus is set on a specific public
support scheme, the German Federal Government’s non-defense R&D project
funding within thematic programmes (DPF). This is the most important tool
used by the German government to fund R&D in private businesses. In 2005,
firms received a total of 745 million euros under this scheme. (BMBF, 2006a,
pp. 188f.)4 The importance of this funding scheme will increase in Germany
in the coming years since it is the main distribution channel for the new High-
Tech strategy launched by the Federal Government (BMBF, 2006b). In the DPF
scheme a subsidy is granted for three years on average. The duration of each
project is known and is considered in the analysis.
In this study, more detailed knowledge of the actual pattern and dynamics of
public R&D funding is obtained. In particular, I tackle the question of whether
the same firms enjoy subsidies over time, which would mean that there is, to
some extent, a pool of firms which are funded continuously, i.e. a certain clien-
tele benefits from state funding permanently. Alternatively one may expect the
composition of subsidized firms to be highly dynamic, thanks to a steady entry
into and exit from the subsidy scheme at the firm level, so that the funded firms
change continuously. The causality between the subsidy allocation and the effects
it induces is however beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the arguments,
aims, and mechanisms of direct R&D project subsidies delivered by the Federal
Government of Germany in the framework of thematic R&D programs. Sec-
tion 3 reviews the empirical literature concerning firms’ participation in R&D
subsidy programmes. The subsequent section depicts some stylized facts on the
structure of the recipients of the German DPF scheme over time. The focus is
on distinguishing whether the firms involved are subsidized for the first time or
whether they have received funding under the DPF scheme previously. The data
set underlying the empirical analysis is described in section 5. The data used
is based on an annual innovation survey, the German part of the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS). This is merged with the German Federal Government’s
DPF database producing a total of 6,360 different firms over the time period from
1994 to 2004. Results of a descriptive analysis of subsidized and not subsidized
firms are shown. The funding scheme is then examined in a multivariate context
with means of markov chains. The econometric model and the estimation results
are presented in section 6, before drawing conclusions in section 7.
4448.5m euros were given by the the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 296.1m
euros by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology.
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2 The Direct Project Funding (DPF) Scheme
Rationale, Objectives and Mechanisms
The German Federal government supports the view that in a market economy
competition makes sure that new products and processes are generated and that
demand potentials and profit opportunities are ascertained by the companies.
Even though companies are responsible for their own R&D and innovation de-
cisions, nevertheless, the government also states that public support can make
sense. Due to external effects of R&D, incentives for companies might be too low
in order to conduct R&D on a level that would be desirable from a welfare point
of view (BT-Drs., 1988, p. 43). The externalities of R&D lead to the problem that
leaking knowledge increases social returns but reduces private returns. If R&D
generates higher social than private returns, the level of R&D activities in the
economy in question is below the socially desirable level (see Levin, Klevorick,
Nelson and Winter, 1987; Adams and Jaffe, 1996). Public support should in-
crease private R&D investment to the socially optimal level. In addition the
government argues that public support of R&D related to public goods like, for
example, the quality of air or water, is justified due to the lack of corresponding
markets. Other reasons for state aid for private R&D can be an extremely long
time horizon of R&D projects, high economic or technical risk, or extremely high
costs which one firm alone cannot bear (BT-Drs., 1984, p. 28; BT-Drs., 1988, p.
43; BT-Drs., 1993, p. 17).
The German government employs a variety of instruments in its R&D policy,
for example, institutional funding, indirect and direct support schemes. Depend-
ing on the objectives pursued, different instruments are used. In cases when a
selective solution is aimed at and other support instruments are insufficiently
target-oriented, too intricate, or a cross-industry key technology is targeted, di-
rect R&D project funding is used (BT-Drs., 1984, pp. 28, 64). The overall
objective of this support scheme is to achieve a high level economic performance
and competitiveness of R&D in selected areas (BT-Drs., 1984, p. 14; BMBF,
2000, p. 55).
Direct R&D project funding (DPF) has existed since the mid 1950s and be-
gan with the public funding of large-scale R&D projects in the field of nuclear
research. In the 1960s, funding was extended to other technological fields, such
as space research or data processing. Besides major research institutions and
universities large firms were also subsidized. At the end of the 1970s the group of
recipients was extended to include SMEs (Fier, 2002). Funding of collaborative
projects has been emphasized within direct R&D project funding since the 1980s.
The DPF scheme has become the most important tool used by the national gov-
ernment to support private businesses’ R&D. Therefore, the focus in this paper
is set on this tool.
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The DPF scheme offers grant aid funding for R&D projects in predefined
fields of technology, for example, biotechnology, sustainable development, infor-
mation technology, and materials research. The fields of technology are selected
by the government and the financial support is thematically restrictive to these
technologies. Within the technology fields several programs are defined which
include funding objectives and rules. These programs run for several years, are
made public in calls and applications have to be made within defined dates. Both
companies and research institutions - or both together in a joint project - submit
project-based applications for funding. In most programs, applications based on
a cooperation of firms and research institutions are recommended though not
obligatory. Program agencies authorized by the government and responsible for
specific thematic areas decide on the application. The scheme itself does not spec-
ify a maximum permissible proportion of recipients that have already received
funding. The criteria for approving a project do not differ between firms that
have already participated in the scheme and firms which want to participate for
the first time.5 The funding is granted on a cost sharing basis. Up to 50 percent
of the R&D project costs are covered by the government. Thus, the funding
directly reduces firms’ R&D costs.
Within the empirical analysis, an issue arises due to the mechanisms of the
subsidy allocation process. The allocation of subsidies is based on a multi-stage
decision-making process. First of all, the company needs to be aware of the
program in order to apply. Secondly, before submitting a proposal it is mostly
recommended in the guidelines of the funding programs that companies should
contact the program agency. Communication with the program agency may lead
to a withdrawal or redesign of the application. Finally, the application can be
rejected by the agency. Thus, there are several points at which the application
process can be broken off.
The government does not report data on this issue, such as rejection rates
or the share of applications being withdrawn by the applicant after contacting
the program agency (BT-Drs., 2005, p. 8). Therefore, we cannot differentiate
between applications, not made due to the ignorance of the company or due to
a preliminary discussion with the program agency and also between applications
which were withdrawn by the company or applications which were rejected by
the program agency. A similar problem occurs in many other studies.6
Hypotheses for Empirical Analysis
The government states in its program guidelines that public financial support to
firm R&D should be only temporary. “Support programmes run for several years.
5In contrast, e.g., within the SBIR program additional criteria apply “for the evaluation of
SBIR applications of firms which had received awards in the past.” (Lerner, 1999, p. 304)
6The only exceptions are studies for Finland, such as e.g. Ali-Yrkko¨ (2005) or Tanayama
(2007), since rejected applications are known.
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It is important that they be properly balanced: On the one hand, applications
need a certain amount of time in order to reach maturity; on the other hand,
they should not become permanently dependent on support.” (BMBF, 2005, p.
VI) A permanent alimentation of specific research areas and thus of firms is not
intended (BT-Drs., 1979, p. 28; BMBF, 2004, p. VI).
The first question to analyze is whether some firms receive subsidies perma-
nently. Though the intention of the government is not to support firms perma-
nently, there are several reasons why firms might be receiving steady support.
First, firms which have participated in the scheme might realize learning effects.
They can use their experience for submitting a successful application. They might
also be better able to rate which R&D projects might be suitable for funding. In
addition, the transaction costs might be less for them since the effort for submit-
ting a (additional) proposal is smaller. Secondly, due to asymmetric information,
not all eligible firms are aware of the funding opportunity and do not submit an
application. Therefore, the probability of receiving subsidies is higher for firms
which have successfully applied for funding in the past. And firms which have
already participated in the support scheme might know the support opportunities
better than the other firms. Third, a firm may have specific characteristics which
increase its probability of success or belong to a group of firms which enjoy pri-
ority treatment by the government, e.g., because of their location, sector activity
or technology specialization.
Since the funding programs run for several years and considering the argu-
mentation in favor of a more stable participation pattern, it is assumed that a
rather persistent participation pattern will be found.
Program agencies’ decisions are based on the proposed R&D projects, not
on firm characteristics. But information on the project-level is not available for
not subsidized projects. However, it can be analyzed which firms had submitted
the best applications and got the grants. Thus the second question to answer is
which type of firms can be found as participants and are thus actually addressed
by the government’s subsidy program. Looking at the government’s reasoning for
running the DPF scheme, i.e. funding of R&D projects with high economic and
technical risk, long time horizon, and budget requirements that go beyond the
capabilities of a single firm and which not would have been carried out without
the public support, it can be assumed that this applies more likely to small and
young firms due to their limited resources. Thus the probability that applica-
tions from these firms are selected and approved by the program agency should
be higher.
Another reason why smaller firms are more likely to be chosen by program
agencies is that small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) have become a key
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target group of innovation policy in Germany. The Federal government states
that one main area of the promotion of industry lies in the promotion of SMEs
(BMBF, 2004, p. 203). They have started activities which focus on promoting
and supporting SMEs. For instance, they launched an initiative entitled ‘Innova-
tion and Future Technologies for Medium-Sized Companies - High-Tech Master
Plan’ in the year 2004 (BMBF and BMWA, 2004). Even in the direct R&D
funding scheme special attention is paid to SMEs. The probability that program
agencies approve project proposals should be higher for SMEs.
On the other hand large firms may have information advantages because they
are able to provide more resources for tracing funding opportunities, since the
costs can be spread over more revenues. Therefore, large firms may have a higher
probability of applying to R&D funding schemes. Thus size is expected to be an
important variable in explaining the participation in the public support program,
although the direction of the impact is ambiguous.
The final goal of the government when offering subsidies to firms is to increase
their competitiveness. Program agencies might think that certain firms are more
capable of achieving this and favor more experienced and capable firms or firms
which are already on a high level or on a promising path (picking-the-winner strat-
egy). Thus regular R&D activities and human capital might positively influence
the agencies’ decisions. Furthermore, firms with a high patent stock compared
to other firms in their industry might be in a more favorable position to achieve
international competitiveness and thus have the advantage of being awarded by
the agencies. Furthermore, firms which grew in the past might be more likely to
be successfully selected in the program. If the firm is subsidized in the previous
years, this growth can be also an effect of the previous support. This could be
an indicator that the project had a positive effect and the firm might have an
advantage to get further projects granted.
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3 Previous Empirical Studies
In the empirical literature there are several studies which include an analysis of
firms’ participation in public R&D programs. This is often related to investi-
gating the effects of public funding on firms’ R&D inputs or outputs. In order
to analyze this question appropriately a potential selection bias has to be taken
into account. For this purpose the determinants of receiving public funding have
to be analyzed. There are only a few papers however, which consider receiving
subsidies over time by at least including a variable for the experience with public
awards.
Duguet (2004) is one of these exceptions. He looks at the subsidy status at
the firm-level in two consecutive years within the time period between 1985 and
1997 and identifies the entries and exits. The overall receipt of R&D subsidies
from any national ministry is taken into account. About a quarter of the firms are
subsidized in two consecutive years whereas about 60 percent are not subsidized
in the previous and current year. The entry and exit rates vary between 5 and 9
percent per year. Thus, he concludes that the stability of recipients in his sample
is rather strong. Applying a logit model in order to estimate the probability of
receiving subsidies, he finds that both the former receipt of subsidies and the av-
erage amount of subsidies have a significantly positive effect. The study does not
control, however, whether the same granting is responsible for the subsidization
of a firm in two consecutive years, i.e. once approved, a subsidy is given in more
than one calendar year. The influence of experience is overestimated in such a
case since firms detected as receiving funding in year t+ 1 are simply continuing
funded projects started in the previous year.
In the first part of their study, Feldman and Kelley (2001) investigated factors
influencing the decision to grant an Advanced Technology Program (ATP) award
in 1998. In a logit model explaining winning an ATP award the two variables
concerning ATP experience, first-time application to ATP and number of previ-
ous ATP awards, had no significant effect. Looking at the descriptive statistics of
these two variables it becomes apparent that they are fairly similar and probably
highly negatively correlated.7 Maybe including only the first-time application
dummy would have shown a significant effect.
Gonza´lez et al. (2005) analyzed the effects of R&D subsidies on R&D per-
formers and non-performers using a unbalanced panel data set of Spanish man-
ufacturing firms. They aggregate subsidies from varies sources, such as regional,
national and EU programs and do not distinguish between them. In a first step
7The means of the first-time application dummy and the number of prior ATP awards are
0.5 and 0.56, respectively. Considering that one firm had 12 prior awards, it results that only
between 1 and 5 further firms had more than one prior award.
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they estimate firms’ expectations of subsidies by applying a probit model for the
probability of receiving a subsidy and an OLS model for the amount. Besides
other firm characteristics, they take into account the receipt of subsidies in the
preceding one or two periods. They found that the subsidy dummies lagged by
one period and by two periods both have a significantly positive influence on the
receipt of a subsidy.
Tanayama (2007) focuses in her study on the application process for R&D sub-
sidies by the Finish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes) via
the number of filed applications between 2000 and 2002. Using a zero-inflated neg-
ative binomial model, she found that the number of applications before 2000 in-
creases both the probability of being a potential applicant for the subsidy scheme
(binary process) and the number of filed applications conditional on being a po-
tential applicant (count process).
Several studies have investigated the participation pattern in subsidy pro-
grams. An overview of empirical studies analyzing the probability of receiving
subsidies is shown in table 1. Only a few of them have controlled for a potential
effect of subsidy experience or prior participation in subsidy schemes. It seems
that a firm’s subsidy history has an impact on further awards, but it is not unam-
biguous. In most studies, analysis of experience effects are not program specific,
but rather aggregate regional, national and European-wide program participation
into one single experience measure. But allocation rules differ between programs
as it was shown in a study by Blanes and Busom (2004). All of the studies ex-
cept the one by Feldman and Kelley (2001) and Tanayama (2007) have neglected
that a subsidy is often given for longer time period than one year. Thus they
did not control for whether a subsidy was newly granted or continued and the
identified effect might be thus overestimated. Among other things, this review
makes it clear that firm-level empirical evidence on persistence in participation of
subsidy programs is rather scarce and not very detailed. I want to contribute to
this literature by controlling for the two mentioned shortcomings. I focus on one
specific support scheme - the DPF scheme - and take into account the duration
of the subsidized projects to correct for a bias due to longer lasting projects. In
the next section the DPF scheme is described in detail.
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Table 1: Overview of Empirical Studies
Authors Country Data (Sector; refer-
ence period; number of
observations)
Estimation Methoda Program Significant variablesb
Feldman and Kelley (2001) USA Mainly manufacturingc;
1998; 239
logit Advanced Technology
Program
+existing linkages to other businesses, +openness regard-
ing results, +new partnerships in project, +new technical
area in project, +maximum score on reviewers’ rating of
technical plan, +maximum score on reviewers’rating of
business plan & economic potentiald
Duguet (2004) France Manufacturing and ser-
vice; 1985-1997; 16,776
logite no specific program;
national R&D subsi-
dies from all min-
istries
+past subsidy dummy, +past subsidy rate(ln),
+size(lnsales), +private R&D/sales(ln),
+debt/sales(ln)f
Gonza´lez et al. (2005) Spain Manufacturing; 1990-
1999; 9,455 (2,214 firms)
probit (in second
step: tobit for sub-
sidy amount)
no specific program;
regional, national, EU
programs aggregated
+subsidy dummy lagged one and two periods, −abnormal
subsidy dummy, +size(emp) lagged, +age, +technologi-
cal sophistication, +capital growth, +domestic exporter
dummy lagged, +foreign capital dummy
Tanayama (2007) Finland Manufacturing and know-
ledge intesive service;
2000-2002; 12,275
count data model (zero-
inflated negative bino-
mial) for no. of applica-
tions
Finnish Funding
Agency for Technol-
ogy and Innovation
(Tekes)
binary and count process: +no. prior applications, -no.
prior applications2, +size(lnemp), +no. board members;
only binary: +export dummy; only count: -age, +age2,
-sales/emp(ln), +sales/emp2, +parent company
Busom (2000) Spain Manufacturing; 1988; 147 probit (used in Heck-
man’s two step model for
R&D effort)
no specific program;
national or European
programs separately
−size(emp), +age, −patents obtained over last 10 years,
−foreign ownershipg
Wallsten (2000) USA Manufacturing and ser-
vice; 1990-1992; 481
3-Stage Least Squares;
1st (2nd) stage: Number
Phase 1(2) Awards
SBIR, Phase 1 and
Phase 2 awards
+SBIR budget, +prior patent applications
Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) Germany Service; 1994-1996 &
1996-1998; 1,084
probite no specific program;
local, national, EU
programs aggregated
+size(lnemp), +location in Eastern Germany, +continu-
ous R&D, +share of emp. with univ. degree in business
admin./economics etc., −districts population density
Almus and Czarnitzki
(2003)
Eastern
Germany
Manufacturing; 1992-
1994, 1994-1996, 1996-
1998; 925
probite no specific program;
local, national, EU
programs aggregated
+size(lnemp), −foreign parent company, −sellers concen-
tration, +R&D department
Aerts and Czarnitzki
(2004)
Belgium Manufacturing & service;
1998-2000; 776
probite no specific program;
local, national, EU
programs aggregated
+size(lnemp), +patentstock/emp., −foreign parent
comp., +export
Blanes and Busom (2004) Spain Manufacturing; 1990-
1996; 15,186 (463 differ-
ent subsidized firms)
multinomial logit (no
R&D; R&D, no par-
ticipation; R&D and
participation), bivariate
probit (national and
regional program)h
no specific program;
regional and national
programs aggregated
+size(emp), +domestic; only nat.: +human capital; only
reg.: −cash flowi
Czarnitzki, Ebersberger
and Fier (2004)
Western
Germany &
Finland
Manufacturing & service;
1994-1996 & 1998-2000;
DE: 1,464; FI: 1,520
multinomial probit (sub-
sidization, collaboration,
both)e
no specific program;
local, national, EU
programs aggregated
+size(lnemp), +share of R&D emp., +lagged patent ap-
plication; only FI: +export
Czarnitzki and Licht
(2006)
Germany Manufacturing; 1992-
1994 & 1994-1996 &
1996-1998 & 1998-2000;
6,462 (3,409 R&D per-
forming firms)
probite no specific program;
local, national, EU
programs aggregated
-no patent stock lagged, -foreign parent company, +ex-
port dummy; only Eastern: +size(lnemp), -size2, -
age(ln), +R&D department, -Western German group as-
sociation; only Western: +patent stock lagged, +credit
rating (ln)
Notes: aIf not other mentioned, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating participation in the subsidy program. bSignificant at least on the 5%-level; + and − indicates positive and
negative effect, respectively. emp = employees. Significant industry and time dummies are not listed. cSectors are not explicitly mentioned. dVariables for first-time application to ATP and
number of previous ATP awards are included, but are not significant. eFirst step estimation within matching approach. fSeparate estimations for each year (12 estimations). Variable is
listed when it is significantly in the same direction at least in ten out of the twelve years. gResults are for national programs since results for European programs must “be interpreted with
caution”. (Busom, 2000, p. 127) hSeparate estimations for six industry groups and national and regional programs; results from the multinomial logit, variable is indicated as significant
when it is significantly in the same direction at least in three out of the six industries. iApplying a bivariate probit model the effect of this variable is different.
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4 Stylized Facts of the German DPF scheme
Information on the Federal government’s DPF scheme is collected in a separate
database called PROFI. This database encompasses detailed information on all
projects funded under the DPF scheme, including starting and end dates of the
funded projects, amount of public funding, total project costs, and all names of
firms and public research organizations involved in the project. The database
serves as basis for the description of the DPF scheme. Public financing of R&D
projects by the way of contract research is excluded from the data set.
Regarding the overall trend in the DPF scheme in the last 25 years, the num-
ber of projects and firms funded each year has changed considerably. In the early
1980s, on average about 2,600 projects of about 1,000 different private firms were
funded every year with more than 900 million euros of public funding per year.
By the year 2005 the number of projects increased by a factor of about 1.6 and
the number of involved firms by a factor of 2.5. The amount of the public subsi-
dies decreased by 50 percent in the same period. Hence, the number of subsidized
projects per firm as well as the average subsidies per project decreased over time.
The distribution of subsidized projects per firm and year is shown in the left bar
chart of figure 1. Two-third of the participating firms had one subsidized project
in 1980. This share increased to 77 percent in 2000 and declined to 75 percent
in 2005. This shift is mainly due to the fact that fewer firms have more than five
projects subsidized in the last years. Therefore the projects were allocated less
concentrated and more firms participated.
Figure 1: Distribution of subsidized and starting subsidized projects per firm and
year within the DPF funding scheme, for different years
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Source: PROFI database; own calculations.
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Since a project is subsidized on average for about three years, one third of
the projects to be observed for a particular year have begun this year. In 1980
there were almost 800 starting projects which were carried out by about 400
different firms (see figure 2).8 The number of firms with new projects remained
the same until 1992 and then began to increase. The peak in 2001 is due to the
temporarily expanded budget for the DPF scheme. This was financed by the
savings from the interest from the appropriation of the revenues of the auction of
the UMTS licenses for public debt repayment. The number of new projects and
firms involved therein have developed similarly to the overall trend. In recent
years around 1,000 new projects in about 800 different firms were subsidized.
Consequently, a lot more firms receive subsidies but each firm has fewer subsi-
dized projects on average and the average award amount also decreased. The
inclusion of more firms in the DPF scheme via the newly allocated projects can
also be seen in the right diagram of figure 1 where the starting projects per firm
are presented for four different points of time. Whereas in 1980, 74 percent of
the firms with new projects got one newly subsidized projects and 5 percent got
more than five new projects subsidized, the new projects were more broadly dis-
tributed in 2005 since 85 percent of the firms which have starting projects get
funding only for one new project.
Since the main interest is the participation pattern in the funding scheme
over time, in the next step I decompose the number of firms with new subsi-
dized projects in a year in terms of their participation history. A look at the
firms’ funding history reveals that in the early 1980s 30 to 40 percent of the
participating businesses received subsidies for the first time.9 As new technology
areas were emphasized and funding was increasingly directed towards SMEs, the
share of first time participants increased in the 1990s to 50 to 60 percent and
remained at that level, although in the meantime the total number of firms that
have participated in the DPF scheme at least once has increased substantially.
From 2003 on - with the decrease of the number of starting projects - the share
of first-time subsidized firms fell back to about 40 percent. In 2005 almost 50
percent of firms with starting projects also received subsidies in the previous year.
8The classification of firms whether they are subsidized or not is based on the announced
period of the project. For example, when a project runs from August 2002 until March 2004,
the firm is marked as being subsidized from 2002 to 2004. This does not necessarily correspond
exactly to the years when the firm receives the payments. Since often the last payment is made
in the year or the second year after the expiration of the project, the calculated transition rates
are not biased due to delayed payments.
9Since the PROFI database begins in 1973, it is not possible to control for subsidies given
before that year. This data restriction might result in a slight shift from the group of firms
which were funded before six or more years to the first time funded firms where the firms were
subsidized before 1973. But this bias is assumed to be rather small and therefore negligible
since the share of firms which re-enter the program after nine years is fairly low.
4 STYLIZED FACTS OF THE GERMAN DPF SCHEME 12
Figure 2: Number of firms with new projects subsidized in the DPF scheme,
controlling for the period since the firm was last subsidized (in years), 1980-2005
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Notes: Last year: Firm had a subsidized project last year; 2-5 years: Firm had subsidized
projects between 2 and 5 years ago; 6 years or more: Firm had a subsidized project 6 or more
years ago; first time: Firm participates in the DPF scheme for the first time.
Source: PROFI database; own calculations.
The share of firms which receive subsidies occasionally is rather low as it is
shown by the share of firms that were last funded between 2 and more years ago.
This indicates that once a firm exits the program and does not receive subsidies
anymore, it is not very probable that the firm will re-enter the program.
From the perspective of the DPF scheme - by looking at all participating
firms - some dynamic is detected within the scheme since almost two-thirds of
the firms which get new projects in a ten year period get new projects only in
one year and about 40 percent of firms which get starting projects in a specific
year participate for the first time. In order to assess the participation pattern
further it is necessary to relate these subsidized firms to all firms, i.e. the popu-
lation of firms. The PROFI database only includes participating firms since it is
based on information on the subsidized projects. Therefore, I use a representative
sample of the population of firms. This sample consists of both participants of
the DPF scheme and non-participating firms which might be potential applicants.
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5 Data Set and Some Statistics
This analysis is intended to examine the program participation structure in Ger-
many in a dynamic context and now looking at all firms. The sample used is
based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual innovation survey
conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of
the BMBF since 1993. The MIP is the German part of the European-wide har-
monized Community Innovation Survey (CIS). It is a stratified random sample of
firms according to firm size, industry and region. I pool the observations from all
years to one dataset. I merge this firm level data with subsidy data which is ex-
tracted from the PROFI database. An advantage of this PROFI data set is that
in contrast to other studies it contains information on subsidies on project-level.
Thus the exact duration of the projects is known and it is possible to identify
the years in which firms have newly granted projects or whether projects are
just continued.10 The project-level data about the subsidies is aggregated to the
firm-level because the analysis is carried out on the firm-level. The firm’s subsidy
status it known for every year since the subsidy information is extracted from
another database which covers all years. Thus it is not necessary to observe the
firm in two consecutive years in order to calculate transition rates for the subsidy
status from one year to another.
Basically the programs within the DPF scheme are open to all firms. But nat-
urally the DPF scheme is only interesting for firms if a program is placed within
the industry in which the firm is active. Thus we restrict the sample to firms
from the manufacturing sector and selected knowledge intensive services since the
DPF scheme mainly targets these branches.11 Furthermore, I keep only observa-
tions for which all variables needed in the multivariate analysis are given.12 In
the end, the sample consists of 6,360 different firms covering the manufacturing
sector from 1994 to 2004 and the knowledge intensive service sectors since 1996.
In addition, it can be presumed that R&D subsidies are more relevant for
firms which seek for innovations. Therefore I mark the firms which are engaged
in innovative activities, i.e. their innovative expenditures are positive in t. Al-
most 5,000 of these firms have innovative activities.
Since the answering of the survey is not obligatory for firms the observed
firms change from year to year in the dataset. How often the firms are observed
is shown in table 2. Almost half of the firms of the whole sample are only ob-
10The classification of firms according to whether they are subsidized or not is based on the
announced period of the project.
11See table 8 in the appendix for an overview of the included sectors.
12In addition, firms with more than 10,000 employees are dropped since for these firms the
assignment of the subsidies is fairly difficult.
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served once. About 14 percent of the firms participate in two years or in three
years. 62 firms and 19 innovating firms even participate in all 11 years. Overall,
the sample consists of 16,958 observations, of which 11,252 are from firms with
innovating activities.
Table 2: Firms’ Observation Pattern in the Sample
No. of Whole sample Innovating firms
observations No. of firms Percent No. of obs. No. of firms Percent No. of obs.
1 3,040 47.80 3,040 2,483 51.45 2,483
2 892 14.03 1,784 795 16.47 1,590
3 903 14.20 2,709 641 13.28 1,923
4 361 5.68 1,444 266 5.51 1,064
5 372 5.85 1,860 230 4.77 1,150
6 196 3.08 1,176 138 2.86 828
7 238 3.74 1,666 122 2.53 854
8 122 1.92 976 64 1.33 512
9 119 1.87 1,071 41 0.85 369
10 55 0.86 550 27 0.56 270
11 62 0.97 682 19 0.39 209
Total 6,360 100.00 16,958 4,826 100.00 11,252
Note: aInnovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t.
The sample includes firms which participated in the DPF scheme and firms
which did not participate. The share of firms which received funding in the DPF
scheme is shown in figure 3. Firms with positive innovation expenditures serve as
a basis for calculating the share of subsidized firms. In the manufacturing sector
the share of firms which participated in the funding scheme remained around
eight percent from 1994 till 2000. Between 2001 and 2003 it increased to 13 per-
cent and then it decreased again to its initial level. For the firms in the knowledge
intensive service sectors basically the same pattern can be observed but at a three
percentage points lower level on average. The overall slight increase of subsidized
firms between 2001 and 2003 can be explained by the overall increase of firms
participating in the funding scheme in this period as shown in section 4.
A certain share of firms participate every year in the DPF scheme. However,
the graph does not exhibit whether the same firms receive subsidies over time or
whether and to which extent firms enter and exit the subsidy scheme. In order
to analyze this question, the transition rates between being subsidized and being
not subsidized are calculated and presented in table 3. Considering the whole
sample it becomes apparent that the subsidization status is fairly permanent.
Almost 99 percent of the firms which do not participate in the funding scheme in
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Figure 3: Share of innovating firms which receive DPF funding, 1994-2005
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Notes: Innovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures. Contract research is
not taken into account.
Source: Own calculations.
year t, do not receive this type of funding in the following year. Thus the share
of firms which enter the funding scheme is extremely low. Looking at the yearly
transition rates no upward or downward trend can be observed.13 Considering
the non-subsidized firms in t which also had no innovation activities in that pe-
riod, the probability that they start to innovate by means of conducting R&D
in t + 1 and receive subsidies is below 0.3 percent. Virtually all of the newly
subsidized firms in t+1 are firms which had already undertaken some type of in-
novation activities in t, and almost always R&D activities were conducted. Thus,
it can be concluded that the funding scheme is not a method of stimulating firms
to undertake R&D activities. But this is also not the goal of this support scheme.
The status of the subsidized firms is persistent to a large extent. Over 80
percent of the subsidized firms maintained their status in the following period
while almost 20 percent did not receive further funding and dropped out of the
funding scheme.14 Compared to the results of the study conducted by Duguet
13Table of yearly transition rates for the not subsidized firms in t can be found in table 9 in
the appendix.
14Taking into account that in 2000 and since 2002 some firms which had received subsidies
were added to the sample, the number of firms which are funded in t is higher than otherwise,
but the inclusion of these observations does not have a severe effect on the transition rates.
For example, the transition rate of firms which remain subsidized from t to t+ 1 even slightly
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Table 3: Transition Rates
Status in t+ 1
Status in t No. of obs. Not subs. Subs. Total
Whole sample
Not subsidized 15,635 98.80 1.20 100.0
Subsidized 1,323 17.61 82.39 100.0
Total 16,958 92.47 7.53 100.0
Sub-sample of innovating firms
Not subsidized 9,929 98.27 1.73 100.0
Subsidized 1,323 17.61 82.39 100.0
Total 11,252 88.78 11.22 100.0
Note: aInnovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t.
(2004) which considers R&D subsidies from any national ministries in France,
a slightly higher dynamic can be observed in France. Recalculating the given
percentages in his study, it turns out that, for example, 7.5 percent of the firms
without subsidies in 1996 receive subsidies in the following year. Given that a
firm is subsidized in 1996, 75.6 percent of these firms also got subsidies in 1997.
However, it has to be considered that, once approved, projects in the DPF
scheme last for several years, about three years on average. Continuation rates
will be overestimated if the persistence due to multi-year projects is not taken
into account. Therefore, in table 4 the subsidized status is split in t + 1. A dis-
tinction is made between firms which have newly subsidized projects - and maybe
additionally ongoing funded projects - and firms which have only ongoing subsi-
dized projects.15 Decomposing the transition rate of firms which receive subsidies
in both periods t and t+1 (82.4%), it turns out that slightly above 20 percent of
the subsidized firms in t start actual newly subsidized projects in t + 1. About
60 percent of the subsidized firms also receive subsidies in t + 1 due to the fact
that projects are approved for several years. Thus, the probability for firms to
receive further funding in a new project is five percentage points higher than the
probability of dropping out of the scheme (22.2% vs. 17,6%). The results show
increases from 82 to 85 for the sample when the extra firms were dropped. To check the
representativeness of the sample, table 10 in the appendix compares the transition rates for the
subsidized firms in t of the population and the sample in each year. It turns out, that the firms
with continued subsidies are slightly over-represented in the sample. But the bias is rather
small.
15For period t I consider two types, subsidized and non-subsidized firms. All of the subsidized
firms in t have a newly approved and subsidized project within the last four years.
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that once a firm has made it into the DPF scheme which is rather rare event,
the probability of getting subsidies for new projects in the following year is more
likely than dropping out of the scheme.
Table 4: More Detailed Transition Rates of Innovating Firmsa
Status in t+ 1
Not Continued Newly
Status in t No. of obs. subsidized subsidized subsidized Total
Not subsidized 9,929 98.27 0.00 1.73 100.0
Subsidized 1,323 17.61 60.17 22.22 100.0
Total 11,252 88.78 7.07 4.14 100.0
Notes: aInnovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t. Firms which
have newly subsidized projects may additionally have ongoing subsidized projects.
Table 5 gives some more information on the dynamic of subsidization for in-
novating firms by their sector, location and size class. Looking at the firms’
sector, the share of firms which enter the scheme in the manufacturing sector is
about twice as high as in the service sector. This is not surprising since R&D
activities are more frequently undertaken in manufacturing firms. Differences in
the transition rates for subsidized firms between the industry and service sectors
are rather small. Regarding firms’ location, the probability of entering into the
funding scheme and dropping out of the scheme is the same for firms located in
West and East Germany. But subsidized firms which are located in the Eastern
part are more likely to get further funding within new approved projects than
just having ongoing subsidized projects. Furthermore, the program participation
transition rates vary with firm size. While 0.7 percent of the non-subsidized firms
with less than 50 employees receive funding in the subsequent period, this share
rises to 3.8 percent for firms with 250 employees or more. Regarding the subsi-
dized firms in t, the rate of dropping out of the scheme is for the group of large
firms lower by over six percentage points compared to the smallest firms. Thus
both the probability of switching into the subsidization status and that of staying
in this status increases with firm size. Therefore, the overall share of subsidized
firms is higher for large firms than for small ones. As the next step, I want to
identify firm-specific factors which influence these probabilities of entering and
remaining in the DPF scheme.
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Table 5: Transition Rates of Innovating Firmsa by Firms’ Sector, Location and
Size Class
Status Sector Location Size Class
Year t Year t+ 1 Manu. Service West East <50 50-249 >=250
Not Subs. Not subs. 98.08 99.01 98.24 98.32 99.33 98.40 96.18
Cont. subs. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Newly subs. 1.92 0.99 1.76 1.68 0.67 1.60 3.82
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Subs. Not subs. 17.30 18.67 17.28 18.29 20.44 18.27 14.79
Cont. subs. 60.02 60.67 63.41 53.47 59.61 59.51 61.14
Newly subs. 22.68 20.67 19.30 28.24 19.95 22.22 24.06
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
No. of obs. 8,938 2,314 7,494 3,758 4,579 3,834 2,839
Notes: aInnovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t. Firms which
have newly subsidized projects may additionally have ongoing subsidized projects.
6 Econometric Analysis
Econometric Model
In this section the dynamics of firms’ participation in the German DPF scheme
are investigated in a multivariate context. It concentrates on the probability of a
transition from one state of subsidization to another in the next period. In partic-
ular I focus on entry into the scheme and getting new projects approved if already
in the scheme. In order to estimate these transitions I use the approach of markov
chains which is seen as a powerful instrument for analyzing dynamic economic
phenomena. (e.g. Nguyen Van, Laisney and Kaiser, 2004) I use a model based
on Gourie´roux (2000) and applied by, for example, Nguyen Van et al. (2004) in
the context of transitions between different states of firm performance or Fryges
(2007) who analyzed changes between sales modes used by firms in international
markets.
Let Yit denote the status of subsidization j of firm i in time t and takes value
1 if firm i has a newly approved project in t and value 0 otherwise. Assuming a
logistic form for the transition probabilities and a set of explanatory variables x,
the probability of transition of firm i from state j in t to state j′ in t+1 is given
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by
Pijj′(t+ 1) ≡ P (Yit+1 = j
′|Yit = j) =
exp(xit+1βjj′)
1∑
j′=0
exp(xit+1βjj′)
, (1)
i = 1, . . . , N , t = 0, . . . , T , and j, j′ = 0, 1. For identification we impose the
restriction βj0 = 0 and obtain
Pij0(t+ 1) =
1
1 + exp(xit+1βj1)
, (2)
Pij1(t+ 1) =
exp(xit+1βj1)
1 + exp(xit+1βj1)
, (3)
with j = 0, 1. Consequently, each row of a transition matrix can be estimated
by a binary logit model, assuming two possible states in t + 1. Let us define
ni,t,t+1(jj
′) = 1 if firm i occupies status j in t and status j′ in t + 1, and 0
otherwise. Then the log-likelihood conditional on the state occupied at time t is
lnL =
1∑
j=0
1∑
j′=0
lnLjj′ , with lnLjj′ =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=0
ni,t,t+1(jj
′) lnPijj′(t+ 1). (4)
Because the quantity
∑1
j′=0lnLjj′ only depends on βj1, the maximum likeli-
hood estimator βˆj1 can be obtained by separate maximization of the elements
of
∑1
j′=0lnLjj′ , where j = 0, 1.
By applying logit models it is possible to identify firm-specific factors which
influence the probability of switching the subsidy status between two periods.
I apply a logit type model that firstly explains the transition from the non-
subsidized status in t to being subsidized in t + 1, i.e. subsidy program entry.
The share of firms which change their status, i.e. enter the scheme, is rather
small compared to the event of remaining non-subsidized. King and Zeng (2001)
show that the maximum likelihood estimator βˆ is biased in rare events data in
finite samples because the probability of the rare event is underestimated - in this
case the estimated probability Pˆi01. They introduce a bias-correcting estimator
β˜ and derive an analytical approximation for estimating the probability Pi01 as
Pi01 ≈
1
1 + exp(xiβ˜01)
+ Ci = P˜i01 + Ci, (5)
where the correction factor Ci is
Ci = (0.5− P˜i01)P˜i01(1− P˜i01)xiV ar(β˜01)x
′
i.
16 (6)
16For simplicity, I have neglected the time subscript t in this formula.
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The estimator P˜i01 + Ci, which is denoted as an approximate Bayesian estima-
tor, is less biased - even though not unbiased - but it is superior in the sense
that it has a smaller mean square error than other estimators of Pi11. (King and
Zeng, 2001) Thus, I apply this rare event logit model to estimate the first element
of the log-likelihood function in equation (4), i.e. the entry into the DPF program.
Secondly, the transition from participating in the subsidy scheme in t to get-
ting another project subsidized in t + 1 - renewing the subsidization status - is
examined by means of a conventional logit model. If a firm get subsidies for a
newly approved project in t+1, the dependent variable equals one. If a firm takes
on value 0 for the dependent variable in t+ 1, the firm does not necessarily exit
the subsidization status completely because firms might get further subsidies for
previously approved projects. But it implies that the firm does not receive a grant
for a new project in t+1. Thus the two states of being not subsidized at all in t+1
and having ongoing subsidized projects in t + 1 that have been awarded in t or
previously, are combined. In these two states ‘nothing’ really happens to the firm.
I assume that the participation pattern follows a first-order Markov process,
i.e. the state in t + 1 only depends on the state of the previous period t. A
Markov-chain of higher order is not necessary because the status of t includes
both newly and continually subsidized firms. Therefore, a large share are also
subsidized in the prior period t− 1 or before, due to the average duration of ap-
proved projects. Instead, I use an additional exogenous variable which accounts
for the overall experience with the funding scheme: The number of projects that
were granted within the last five years (between t− 4 and t). This ensures that
each earlier funded project is counted only once.
An alternative model to analyze persistence could be a dynamic panel dis-
crete choice model. But due to the limited number of observations in specific and
consecutive years and the few status changes between the years, this cannot be
applied. Instead, I pool the data from the different years.
Econometric Implementation
The selection of variables used to explain the participation of firms in the DPF
scheme is based primarily on the hypotheses described in section 2 and on the
results of previous empirical studies (see section 3). The means of the explana-
tory variables are presented in table 6, with separate values shown for the four
possible state combinations of the dependent variables.
6 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 21
Subsidy-related variables
Previous experience with the DPF scheme is assumed to have a positive effect
on the probability of entering the subsidy program, again. There are various
reasons for this as it was explained in section 2. In a nutshell, first, these firms
might have learning effects and know how to submit a successful application. For
the application they can fall back on their experience and need less effort. Due
to asymmetric information, not all eligible firms are aware of the program and
apply. Therefore, the probability of receiving subsidies is higher for the firms
which had contact with the program previously. Third, a firm may have specific
characteristics which increase its probability of success or it belongs to a group
of firms which enjoy priority by the program agency. Regarding the second ques-
tion, more experienced firms might also be more likely to stay in the program
than a firm which have less experience due to the first reason. In order to analyze
whether the experience with this specific subsidy scheme has an effect beyond the
status at time t which is given, the variable Experience is generated. It contains
the number of approved projects within the preceding five years, i.e. between
t − 4 and t. Counting the projects not only distinguishes between experience
and no experience but also reveals how much experience the firm has gathered.
Regarding the sample of non-subsidized firms in t, 17 percent of the firms which
switch into the subsidy scheme had at least one subsidized project between t− 4
and t − 1. This share is only 2 percent for the firms which stay not subsidized
in t + 1. The maximum number of approved projects in this period for non-
subsidized firms in t is fairly low with two projects. Regarding the firms which
were subsidized in t, the most successful firm in terms of getting projects ap-
proved in the last five years has 21 beginning projects. The average Experience
variable is also significantly higher for the firms which get further funding via a
new project in t+1. These firms have, on average, 3.6 subsidized projects within
the last five years, thus about twice as many as firms with no or no new projects
in t+ 1.
It is also controlled for whether a firm still gets subsidies from ongoing projects
in t+1 with means of the dummy variable Continuation. The question is whether
the still ongoing contact with the program agency has an additional positive im-
pact on the likelihood of receiving further projects. On the other hand, the
variable indicates when it takes the value zero, i.e. the firm does not get a new
project granted in t+ 1, that the firm will drop out of the scheme because it has
no ongoing projects in t + 1. Thus these firms might be especially eager to get
a new project funded. 77 percent of the only previously subsidized firms have a
further funded project while 90 percent of the firms which get a newly approved
project also have other ongoing subsidized projects.
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Table 6: Comparison of Means of the Explanatory Variables
Status in t Not subsidized Subsidized
Status in t+ 1 Not subs. Subs.a Not newly subs. Newly subs.
Continuationt+1 0.000 0.000 0.774 0.898***
Experiencesince t−4 0.026 0.209*** 1.683 3.554***
Exp EUsince t−2 0.069 0.177*** 0.248 0.417***
Exp regionalsince t−2 0.161 0.297*** 0.323 0.486***
Sub supplyt+1 3.182 4.459*** 4.176 4.925***
Log(Employees) 4.250 5.439*** 4.845 5.232***
Employees change 0.030 0.033 0.039 0.066**
Log(Age) 2.705 2.796 2.735 2.684
R&D no 0.279 0.047*** 0.000 0.000
R&D occ 0.237 0.163** 0.149 0.061***
R&D con 0.484 0.791*** 0.851 0.939***
Qualification 0.209 0.249** 0.338 0.379**
Patent stock devb 0.697 2.459*** 2.991 4.880**
Group national 0.335 0.419** 0.410 0.446
Group foreign 0.094 0.105 0.131 0.129
East 0.335 0.326 0.301 0.415***
No. of obs. 9,757 172 1,029 294
Notes: aAll firms which do not receive subsidies in t and enter the program in t + 1 are
newly subsidized. bSince the patent stock is not available for 2003 and 2004, the number of
observations is smaller for this variable. *** (**,*) indicate that the means are significantly
different on the level of 1% (5%, 10%) based on a t-Test. Unless otherwise specified, the
explanatory variables refer to time t. Industry and time dummies are not shown.
I not only control for the experience with the funding scheme in prior years,
but also for experience with other sources of subsidies. Therefore, dummy vari-
ables are included to indicate whether the firm participated in a European
(Exp EU) or a regional (Exp regional) funding scheme within the preceding
three year period t− 2 to t. On the one hand, firms which participate in a broad
range of funding programs probably know the subsidy system with its funding
opportunities quite well and have a lot of expertise in applying for and getting
public grants. On the other hand, the DPF scheme might particularly support
firms which do not get other subsidies. However normally other subsidy sources
are unknown to the agencies which decide on the projects, if they get these sub-
sidies for other projects, than those they applied to DPF. Therefore, a positive
effect of applying and granting is expected. The comparison of means shows
that firms with new subsidized projects in t + 1 also get subsidies from the two
other sources of funding significantly more often than the other firms. For France
and Spain, positive effects of previous subsidies on the likelihood of participation
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in any program were found, as is shown by Duguet (2004) using past subsidy
dummy and past subsidy rate and Gonza´lez et al. (2005) with subsidy dummies
lagged by one and two periods. None of the two studies controlled for whether
the past subsidies were given in the same subsidy program. Focusing on a specific
scheme Tanayama (2007) found a positive relation between the number of prior
applications and filing a further application whereas Feldman and Kelley (2001)
did not detect a significant effect.
In addition, the beginning of funding programs in new areas is controlled
for. From time to time, the government launches sub-programs within the DPF
scheme in ‘new’ technology areas or shifts the focus from one area of research to
another. Firms from other industries might be addressed so that new firms are
recorded - naturally - within the DPF scheme or the firms’ chances of getting
a subsidy increase due to the higher supply of subsidies. In contrast, in other
technology areas where programs end, chances of getting a subsidy decrease. In
order to take these shifts over time into account in the estimation, the variable
Sub supply is generated which includes the amount of subsidies (in 10 million eu-
ros) which are approved for starting projects within a certain industry17 in year
t+ 1. This variable is constructed based on the PROFI database and represents
the population of the DPF scheme. Thus it is a proxy for the supply of subsi-
dies for a firm. Comparing the firms with newly subsidized projects and with no
(new) projects, it becomes apparent that the supply of subsidies is larger in those
branches and years for firms with approved projects. On an average, above 45
million euros are authorized for new projects in these industries per year. In the
industries of not newly subsidized firms in t+1 the amounts are 32 million euros
and 42 million euros, respectively. Wallsten (2000) constructed a variable in his
study which approximates the SBIR budget potentially available to each firm,
depending on the type of research. He found a positive effect of this variable on
the probability of winning an SBIR Phase I and II award.
Other variables
As explained in section 2, firm size is expected to be an important variable
in explaining the participation in the DPF program though the direction of the
impact is ambiguous. A firm’s size is measured by the number of employees
in logarithms (Employees). The comparison of means exhibits that firms with
new subsidized projects are significantly larger than those firms without (new)
projects. Comparing the two groups with newly subsidized projects in t+ 1 and
considering the average firm size with means of the number of employees (not in
17The programs within the DPF scheme are linked to technology areas which cannot be
directly converted into industries, e.g., based on the NACE classification. However, in order
to control for the supply, the industries which the participating firms belong to are taken into
account. The classification of the industries can be found in the appendix in table 8.
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logarithms), the firms which were already subsidized in t are 1.5 times larger as
the firms which just entered the program (917 vs. 582 employees). This indicates
that only the largest firms regularly get subsidies for new projects and contradicts
the aim of focussing on SMEs. The increase of the participating probability with
firm size is found for most subsidy programs, e.g. Duguet (2004), Gonza´lez et al.
(2005), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), or Blanes and Busom (2004). The only study
which found a negative effect of firm size is the one by Busom (2000).
Besides the level of the employees, the change in the number of employees
between t− 1 and t relative to the number of employees in t− 1 is also included
in the regressions (Employees change). It is assumed that firms which have de-
veloped positively and are already on a growth path may most likely be picked
by the program agency in order to augment this development. Looking at the
descriptive statistics, the average firm growth is not significantly larger for firms
which enter the scheme than for the ongoing not subsidized firms. Hence it does
not seem to be that growing firms are more likely to be picked. If the firm has
been subsidized in the previous years, this growth can also be an effect of the
public support. Indeed employment growth is significantly larger for the subsi-
dized firms which get a new project granted.
Young firms should also enjoy special attention under Federal innovation pol-
icy. Young high-tech firms may suffer from a lack of financial capacity, due to
insufficient resources of their own and limited access to capital markets. However,
the DPF scheme does not focus on start-up firms in particular though there are
some sub-programs which target high-tech start-ups, for example, BioChance in
the biotechnology field. Whether age plays an actual role in receiving subsidies,
is examined by the logarithm of a firm’s age (in years, Log(age)). The mean of
firm’s age does not exhibit a significant difference between the groups. The effect
of age is not clear throughout the programs and countries. While Gonza´lez et al.
(2005) and Busom (2000) found a positive impact of age, it has no effect in the
studies of Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) and Almus and Czarnitzki (2003).
Overall, the sample is restricted to firms with positive innovation expendi-
tures. However this does not necessarily imply that the firms actively conduct
R&D. Innovation expenditures also include expenditures for extramural R&D
(allocated to and performed by other companies), the acquisition of machinery,
equipment, software or other external knowledge, training for firms’ personnel
specifically for the development and/or introduction of new or significantly im-
proved products and processes etc. Since the DPF scheme is directed towards
R&D activities, the past performance of these activities indicates the experience
with R&D and accumulated knowledge in R&D. Due to the activities in this
area, firms with in-house R&D might also be aware of potential support pro-
grams offered. Thus in-house R&D activities probably enhance the probability
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of applying to the DPF scheme. The program agency might also favor firms
with the capability to successfully carry out R&D. Conducting of R&D activi-
ties is distinguished according to the regularity of these activities. The variable
R&D occ (R&D con) indicates that the firm performs R&D on an occasional
(continuous) basis. A proportion of the not subsidized firms in t may also have
no such activities (R&D no). Continuous R&D activities are significantly more
often observed for newly subsidized firms. A significantly positive effect of the
extent of R&D activities was found in several studies, e.g. Czarnitzki and Fier
(2002) which used the regularity of R&D activities, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003)
for the existence of an R&D department, Czarnitzki et al. (2004) for the share of
R&D employees and Duguet (2004) for the ratio of private R&D expenditure to
sales.
In addition to R&D activities, another measure of firms’ capabilities to gener-
ate and acquire knowledge is included in the regressions: The share of employees
with a university degree (Qualification). Since qualified employees within the
R&D process increase the human capital within R&D and the absorptive capac-
ity, more ideas for future R&D projects are generated. (Blanes and Busom, 2004)
Hence, the pool of potential R&D projects is larger and thus the probability of
promising and profitable projects among them increases. Qualified employees
in the administration area might be more successful in fund-raising for R&D
projects. (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002) Thus this variable is expected to have a
positive effect on the likelihood of applying for a subsidy and being approved by
the program agency. The descriptive statistics show that firms with new projects
have a higher share of qualified personnel. The positive influence of human capi-
tal on the participation in subsidy schemes is shown by Blanes and Busom (2004)
and Czarnitzki and Fier (2002).
A proxy variable for a firm’s capacity to create new knowledge is its patent
stock (Patent stock). Firms have proved to be able to transfer R&D into inven-
tions, which is a main success criteria under the DPF scheme. This variable is
generated by depreciating the sum of all patent applications which were filed at
the European Patent Office since 1979 until t. The depreciation rate is constant
and equals 0.15, which is common in the literature. (e.g. Hall, 1990)18 Since the
patent behavior varies between industries, the variable used in the regressions is
scaled to the industry mean and measures the deviation rate from the industry
average (Patent stock dev). The firm’s patent stock is divided by the average of
the patent stock in the industry (2-digit-level). Since the patent information is
only available up to the year 2002, the impact of this variable is analyzed by a
18The resulting formula for the calculation of the patent stock of firm i at time t is:
Patent stockit = (1 − DR) ∗ Patent stockit−1 + PAit where DR is the Depreciation Rate
and PA the number of filed patent applications.
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sub-sample of firms which excludes the observations from 2003 and 2004. The
descriptive statistics show that firms which have a higher patent stock compared
to the industry average both enter into the scheme and renew their status with
new grants more often.
Firms which belong to a company group might benefit from this member-
ship due to knowledge transfers within the group. Besides, SMEs which belong
to a group with a large parent company are not eligible anymore for DPF sub-
programs designed for SMEs. The DPF scheme might be also oriented in par-
ticular towards domestic firms since the government wants to generate economic
effects located in Germany out of DPF funding. In order to control for this, two
dummy variables are included in the regression. Group national takes on the
value one if the firm is part of domestic company group. If the firm has a foreign
headquarter, group foreign equals one. In the descriptive statistics no signifi-
cant difference can be observed. A negative effect of a foreign parent company
was found by Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) for Belgium.
In Germany there is a special situation due the country’s history and the re-
unification in 1989. The Eastern part is still way behind in terms of productivity,
and large transfer payments and promotion programs are directed to this geo-
graphic region. But the DPF scheme is not part of this system and does not focus
particularly on firms located in the Eastern part, except the two sub-programs
InnoRegio and Innovative Regional Growth Cores. However, due to still existing
differences between the Western and Eastern part, I include a dummy variable
(East) for firms located in Eastern Germany in the regressions. Regarding en-
tering into the scheme, there is no systematic difference. But once firms have
entered the scheme and are subsidized, firms from the Eastern part are more
likely to receive subsidies for new projects.
To capture additional industry specific effects, dummy variables are included
in the regressions, indicating to which sector a firm belongs to. The sectors are
defined based on the technology-level and according to the OECD taxonomy.
(OECD, 2003) About 63 percent of the firms with newly approved projects in
t+ 1 are from the medium-high or high technology manufacturing sector. In ad-
dition, year dummies are generated in order to control for temporal heterogeneity.
To identify the determinants for continuous subsidization under the DPF by
newly approved projects, basically the same variables are used as for the explain-
ing of entering into the DPF scheme. In order to get further projects approved
it can be assumed that firms had to prove themselves in the previous subsidized
projects. But variables indicating the success of former subsidized projects are
not available and so cannot be taken into account. Instead, firm variables are in-
cluded in order to detect which characteristics these firms have. It is also possible
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that receiving DPF funding over a long time may have changed firm character-
istics. Comparing the firms which do not receive subsidies in t and enter the
program in t+1 with the firms which received subsidies in t and also have newly
granted subsidies in t + 1, it becomes apparent that in fact most explanatory
variables differ.
Empirical Results
The results of the regressions are presented in table 7.19 The first column in-
cludes the vector of coefficients which explain the transition from the status
non-participant at time t to the status participant at time t + 1, i.e. entry into
the DPF scheme.20 The third column shows the coefficients which discriminate
between firms that have a newly approved project in t + 1 and those which do
not, for subsidized firms in t. In columns two and four the respective marginal
changes, calculated as first differences, are shown.
Subsidy-related variables
The results show that prior experience with the funding schemes (Experience),
measured as the number of approved projects within the last five years, helps firms
to enter the program again, compared to firms which did not participate in the
program before. The more experience a firm has with the funding scheme, the
higher is the probability of getting new projects approved in t+ 1 provided that
the firm is subsidized already at time t. The relationship between experience and
the predicted probability of getting a new project funded for subsidized firms
in the preceding period is depicted by the lower right graph in figure 4 in the
appendix. Setting all other variables to their mean, the graph clearly reflects
the positive correlation between the number of employees and the (predicted)
propensity to get a new project approved. The large impact of firm’s experience
can also be seen by the predicted probability reached by this variable.21
The continuation of a subsidized project (Continuation), i.e. getting subsi-
dies in t + 1 for a project which was approved some time before, has no effect
19The results were obtained using the statistical software package STATA, version 9.2 SE. For
the estimations of the rare events logit model, I used a program written by Michael Tomz, Gary
King, and Langche Zeng, which is available at http://gking.harvard.edu. (King and Zeng, 2001)
20Applying a conventional logit model, the coefficients increase or decrease slightly and the
standard errors are slightly larger. However, the category of the significance level of the variables
remains the same.
21One might think that firms which conduct the subsidized projects in a co-operation with
other firms or research institutions have a higher probability of getting new projects approved
since the support of joint projects become more important. Since 90% of all firms with subsi-
dized projects in t are involved in joint projects, including a corresponding dummy variable in
the regression, this does not have a significant effect.
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Table 7: Regression Results
Not Subsidized → Subsidized Subsidized → Newly Subsidized
Rare events logit model Logit model
Variable Coefficient FD Coefficient FD
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Continuationt+1 0.354 0.0506
(0.224)
Experiencesince t−4 1.236*** 0.0214 0.363*** 0.0483
(0.198) (0.051)
Exp EUsince t−2 0.525** 0.0059 0.287* 0.0439
(0.241) (0.170)
Exp regionalsince t−2 0.462** 0.0050 0.206 0.0316
(0.227) (0.175)
Sub supplyt+1 0.052*** 0.0002 0.040* 0.0027
(0.018) (0.022)
Log(Employees) 0.535*** 0.0000 0.155** 0.0012
(0.057) (0.065)
Employees change 0.125 0.0001 0.846** 0.0133
(0.272) (0.427)
Log(Age) -0.010 0.0002 0.013 0.0002
(0.067) (0.077)
R&D occ 1.089*** 0.0137
(0.410)
R&D con 1.394*** 0.0139 0.512* 0.0695
(0.377) (0.310)
Qualification 1.143*** 0.0011 0.715** 0.0112
(0.308) (0.346)
Group national -0.312* -0.0026 0.011 0.0017
(0.182) (0.185)
Group foreign -0.707** -0.0050 -0.193 -0.0282
(0.293) (0.272)
East 0.126 0.0013 0.588*** 0.0958
(0.203) (0.192)
Constant -8.295*** -4.372***
(0.492) (0.780)
No. of obs. 9,929 1,323
Wald χ2all 255.59*** 140.84***
Wald χ2year 20.98**
Log-Likelihood -585.588
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.164
Notes: *** (**,*) indicate significance level of 1% (5%, 10%); FD = First Difference. The first difference gives
the discrete change in the expected value caused by increasing dummy variables from 0 to 1, Experience
from 0 to 1 (1 to 2) in first (second) regression, the mean of Sub supply, Employees and Age by 10 percent
and the mean of Employees change and Qualification by 10 percentage points, while holding the other
explanatory variables at their means. Unless otherwise specified, the variables refer to time t. Standard
errors are clustered by firm because almost 50% of the firms appear more than once in the sample.
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on remaining in the program. Thus the possibility that a firm drops out of the
scheme does not increase the likelihood of getting a new project granted. This
also indicates that subsidies are not necessarily approved after another project
has ended. Instead firms may have several subsidized projects at the same time.
Experience with other innovation programs has a significant effect on the
probability of entering the program. The effect of having participated in a EU
program (Exp EU) is slightly higher than participation in regional programs
(Exp regional). This might be due to the fact that the EU application process
is more similar, and maybe closer in terms of what is demanded, to the DPF
than regional programs are. However, successful applications to other programs
is almost irrelevant for getting new projects approved once a firm is in the DPF
scheme. Overall, experience with the specific subsidy scheme greatly helps to
place another successful application. Experience with other subsidy programs
has a favorable effect on entering the program but not on staying in it.
Besides the experience with subsidy programs, it is of course imperative that
subsidies are offered to the particular industry in which a firm operates at the
‘right’ time (Sub supply). This is particularly relevant to the DPF scheme which
offers thematically focused R&D funding within predefined areas of technology.
If the supply is large in the industry at time t + 1, the probability of entering
the program and receiving new subsidies increases. Thus in order to identify
the pattern of participation, it is necessary to control for the overall supply of
subsidies by sectors and years.
Other variables
The objective of the government to subsidize particularly SMEs in this scheme
cannot be confirmed. The probability of non-subsidized firms in t entering the
scheme and the probability of subsidized firms in t getting funding for a new
project increases with firm size.22 The upper graphs in figure 4 depict the pre-
dicted probability for the two transitions dependent on the number of employees,
with all other variables set to their mean. Since the program entry constitutes
a rare event, the corresponding predicted probability is fairly low in absolute
terms and only reached 0.3 percent for firms with less than 1,000 employees. But
it is not negligible because of that. While the graph shows that the predicted
probability of entering the scheme increases for all firm sizes in this range, the
corresponding graph for the probability for already subsidized firms of getting
a new project approved only has a relatively steep slope for smaller firms. The
graph becomes more flat with more than 200 employees. Overall, the positive
correlation between firm size and the propensity of getting a project approved
22I also included the squared employee variable in the regression in order to control for a
potential non-linear relationship. But the squared term was not significant in both regressions.
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can be seen. The source of this divergence from the government’s objective can-
not be detected. Either SMEs do not apply more frequently for subsidies, or the
agency does not enforce this focus, or the focus is only set in very few programs
within the DPF scheme so the effect does not show when all industries are taken
into account. Bearing in mind that the sample covers the period 1994-2004, it is
also possible that there was a shift towards SMEs over this period, but that this
was not revealed due to the pooling of cross-sections. Firms’ age (Age) does not
matter since it does not have a significant effect on either transition probability.
A firm’s employment growth in the past (Employees change) does not have
an effect on the probability of entering the scheme but positively influences the
likelihood of getting further subsidies. The growth might be seen as an indicator
of the successful conduct of previously subsidized projects. One has to bear in
mind that all of these firms have received subsidies from DPF before.
In order to enter the DPF scheme, it is important that firms are engaged in
R&D. It is not sufficient to have innovation activities - the sample is restricted
to firms with positive innovation expenditures - but in addition firms should un-
dertake their own R&D. The likelihood of entering the scheme increases if R&D
activities are conducted. But it does not matter whether R&D is conducted
continuously or occasionally since both coefficients are statistically equal. On
average the probability increases by one percent if a firm conducts its own R&D.
In those cases in which a firm receives subsidies from the DPF scheme in t, the
firm conducts R&D at least occasionally. Discriminating between the two levels,
it is shown that continuous R&D activities only slightly increase the likelihood
of getting funding for a new project.23 Furthermore, human capital is relevant
(Qualification). When a firm has a larger share of graduated employees, the
probability of entering the program increases either because, for example, they
apply more often, have better elaborated applications or are chosen more often by
the agencies. The effect on the probability is larger for firms with higher shares
of qualified employees as is displayed in the lower left graph in figure 4. These
capabilities still affect the probability of getting new projects if the firm already
participates in the scheme.
It is assumed that firms which already have a better technological perfor-
mance - measured by firm’s patent stock compared to the industry average
(Patent stock dev) - might be picked by the program agencies because they are
promising candidates. This is examined by means of a sub-sample of firms. Since
the patent applications are not known for 2003 and 2004, observations from these
two years were dropped. In table 11 in the appendix the results of the regressions
23I also included the innovation intensity as an explanatory variable, but no significant effect
on the probabilities was detected.
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are shown. In columns (a) and (c) the same regressions as in table 7 are shown,
but using the sub-sample. In the regressions presented in columns (b) and (d)
the patent stock variable is included. It turns out that the patent stock does not
have an effect on the probability of entering into the support scheme or renewing
the status in the scheme. I also ran a regression with the firms’ patent stock not
related to the industries average, but the results remained the same.24 Thus for-
mer success with R&D activities in terms of patent applications does not matter
in this context.
Overall, differentiating between the two measures which either indicate that
the firm is already technologically further developed than others (Patent stock
dev) or that the firm is on a promising and successful path because it grows
(Employees change), none of the variables have an impact on entering the scheme.
It seems to be sufficient that a firm shows that it has the overall capabilities to
finish the suggested project successfully. But the employment growth might be
seen as a success indicator of previously subsidized projects because the higher
the growth rate the higher is the likelihood of getting further projects granted.
The affiliation to a domestic company group (Group national) and whether
the headquarters are located abroad (Group foreign) negatively affect the allo-
cation process if a firm enters the program. The effect is more significant for firms
with a foreign headquarter than a national one. Once a firm is in the scheme,
the status of belonging to a company group has no further effect on getting new
projects approved. For the probability of entering the funding scheme it does
not matter where the firm is located (East), i.e. whether it is located in the
Eastern or Western part of Germany. But once a firm from the Eastern part has
made it into the scheme, it has a higher probability of getting further projects
approved. As a consequence the East German firms’ participation is relatively
high in the scheme. This result is noteworthy since for East Germany a variety
of other public support programs are available for firms in this area.
The industry, classified according to the technology scope, in which a firm
operates does not seem to have a significant effect on the transition probabilities.
Performing a Wald test, joint significance of the industry dummies could not be
found in any regression and thus are dropped from the presented regressions. In-
dustry effects obviously only relate to the supply-side effects of program volumes
offered to a certain sector. The year dummies were only jointly significant in
the second regression and therefore included in that regression. The overall low
24I also included in one regression the patent stock variable but excluded the variable Qualifi-
cation since it might be suspected, that a potential effect of the patent stock is captured by the
qualification variable, though the correlation between these two variables is low (-0.02 (-0.08)
in the sample of not subsidized (subsidized) firms in t). Excluding the variable Qualification
from the regression does not change the results.
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additional explanation power of these two sets of dummy variables may be due
to the inclusion of the overall subsidy supply variable which is generated on a
more detailed industry level and a yearly basis.
Sensitivity tests
In order to test the sensitivity of the results, I split the sample according to a
firm’s size or location and run the regressions for the sub-samples again. In order
to conduct separate estimations depending on firm’s size, I differentiate between
small, medium and large firms. Firms with 50 employees or less are considered
as small firms. Medium-sized firms have between 51 and 500 employees. Firms
with more than 500 employees are deemed to be large firms. The results are
presented in table 12 in the appendix. It becomes apparent that some factors
differ with firm size regarding the entry into the subsidy scheme. In the group
of small firms, young firms are more likely to enter the scheme. Participating
experience in regional subsidy programs particularly helps medium-sized firms to
get into the funding scheme. Large firms do not need to exhibit their knowledge
capabilities. Neither the R&D activities nor the share of qualified employees have
an effect. I also split the sample into two sub groups, according to whether firms
in the sample are located in the Western or Eastern part of Germany. About
two-thirds of the firms are located in West Germany. There is one noticeable
difference, i.e. experience in other funding schemes increase the probability of
entering the scheme only for Western firms.
The analysis also shows that the results differ for the two transition prob-
abilities, i.e. different variables have an effect on the receipt of a new subsidy,
depending on whether the firm participated in the previous period. These differ-
ences indicate a different selection for the two groups, either on firms’ application
side or authorities’ approving side, although there are no official rules to evaluate
projects of already participating firms differently.
7 Conclusions
In this study the participation pattern of firms over time within the German
R&D funding scheme, the DPF scheme, is analyzed. In order to investigate the
persistence of funding it is necessary to distinguish between two types of persis-
tence. One is simply due to the fact that funded projects may run for more than
one calendar year. The other is due to newly approved projects. In the DPF
scheme, approved projects last on average for about three years.
Looking at the firms which participate in the DPF scheme some dynamic is
detected since about 40 percent of firms which get starting projects in a specific
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year participate for the first time. In a second step the DPF scheme is related
to the population of firms by using a representative sample of German firms.
Transition rates are calculated which describe the participation in a univariate
context. The share of innovating firms which enter the funding scheme is ex-
tremely low. Over 98 percent of the firms which do not participate in the DPF
scheme in a particular year, do not receive DPF funding in the following year.
Thus the detected dynamic within the DPF scheme decreases if the new entrants
are related to the population of firms.
The rate at which subsidized firms are also subsidized in the following year
equals about 80 percent. Distinguishing between the two types of persistence, 22
percent of subsidized firms get new subsidized projects in the following year and
60 percent of the firms remain subsidized due previously approved projects. Thus,
the subsidization of firms is quite persistent in the examined support scheme. Sev-
eral reasons might be responsible for this finding. On the side of firms applying,
it might be due to the existence of asymmetric information. Not yet subsidized
firms may have information deficiencies regarding possible sources of funding. On
the other hand the subsidized firms might have realized learning effects due to
previous applications or participation in the scheme, with the result that they
are selected more often. However the finding could also be due to the program
agencies’ selection rules and the result of a policy favoring a certain clientele. In
this case the subsidy policy should be reconsidered. It cannot be distinguished
whether the allocation pattern found is due to the application behavior of firms
or due to the decision of the program agencies. We can only observe the net
outcome: whether a firm is (newly) subsidized or not. It would definitely be a
step forward if corresponding data were available for this support scheme from
the firm’s first contact with the program agency onwards.
The multivariate analysis shows that for the probability of getting new projects
approved for the funding scheme, experience in the same scheme matters, beyond
the subsidy status in the preceding year. At the same time, it is important to
control for the overall supply of subsidies for different industries. In addition,
large firms are more successful in receiving funding for new projects. Thus the
evidence cannot confirm that the scheme is achieving the government’s aim of
supporting SMEs in particular. The hypotheses that firms with higher knowledge
capabilities are more likely to enter and stay in the scheme can be supported as I
found positive impacts of R&D activities and human capital. Recent firm growth
also increases the probability of receiving further grants in the following year if
a firm participates. Thus, the most promising and best equipped firms partic-
ipate more frequently in the DPF scheme which indicates a picking-the-winner
strategy on the part of the program agency. On the other hand, the actual and
achieved technological performance of a firm - measured by a firm’s patent stock
compared to the industry average - does not matter regarding the participation
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in the support scheme. Firms located in East Germany have a higher probability
of remaining subsidized, once they make it into the scheme. The disproportionate
participation of East German firms is noticeable since a variety of other public
support programs exist solely for this area.
The differences in the regressions results indicate a different selection for the
two groups - new DPF entrants and new projects for DPF participants-, either
on firms’ application side or on authorities’ approving side. As argued earlier, the
source of the difference cannot be identified. Another shortcoming in the data
used in this study is that no variables regarding the success of prior subsidized
projects are known. This project-level information might have an impact on the
decision to approve another project of a subsidized firm.
This work is an investigation of the dynamics of an R&D funding scheme. It
looked at which firms receive the public financial support and how this public
support evolves over time. It tries to assess whether the participants correspond
to the government’s announcements of whom they aim to reach with the particu-
lar scheme. Besides no assessment of the effectiveness of the allocation of public
money has been made. In this study the receipt of the money is a binary variable,
either a firm participates or not. But it would also be worthwhile to consider the
amount of money in order to weight the participation and assess its importance.
In a further step the effects of public funding should be investigated so that the
allocation can be evaluated. In doing so it would be important to distinguish
between the different types of participants, i.e. whether a firm is new or regu-
larly in the scheme. Another issue for further research would be to examine the
behavior of the firms and therefore the program effects might change if a firm is
continually publicly funded so that they count on the money.
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Appendix
Table 8: Overview and Aggregation of Industries
Industry Sector Service Sector
Branches of Industry NACE Branches of Industry NACE
Manufacturing Knowledge intensive services
Textile 17-19 Computer/telecomm. 72, 64.2
Wood/paper/printing 20-22 Technical services 73, 74.2-74.3
Chemicals 23-24 Consultancies 74.1, 74.4
Plastic/rubber 25
Glass/ceramics 26
Metals 27-28
Machinery 29
Electrical engineering 30-32
Medical, precision, and
optical instruments 33
Vehicles 34-35
Furniture/recycling 36-37
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Table 9: Transition Rates for Not Subsidized Firms in t of the Sample
Status in t+ 1
No. of Not
Year obs. subs. Subs. Total
1994 307 97.39 2.61 100.0
1995 500 97.80 2.20 100.0
1996 1,142 97.64 2.36 100.0
1997 667 99.25 0.75 100.0
1998 1,331 98.87 1.13 100.0
1999 765 97.65 2.35 100.0
2000 1,147 97.99 2.01 100.0
2001 647 97.53 2.47 100.0
2002 1,054 98.58 1.42 100.0
2003 724 98.48 1.52 100.0
2004 1,645 98.60 1.40 100.0
Total 9,929 98.27 1.73 100.0
Table 10: Transition Rates for Subsidized Firms in t of the Population and the
Sample
Status in t+ 1
Populationa Sample
No. of Not No. of Not
Year obs. subs. Subs. Total obs. subs. Subs. Total
1994 1,697 14.79 85.21 100.0 27 14.81 85.19 100.0
1995 1,875 27.04 72.96 100.0 35 31.43 68.57 100.0
1996 1,816 16.85 83.15 100.0 91 4.40 95.60 100.0
1997 2,010 16.17 83.83 100.0 66 13.64 86.36 100.0
1998 2,039 17.85 82.15 100.0 98 17.35 82.65 100.0
1999 2,234 20.77 79.23 100.0 62 20.97 79.03 100.0
2000 2,399 22.72 77.28 100.0 177 20.34 79.66 100.0
2001 2,738 10.04 89.96 100.0 83 6.02 93.98 100.0
2002 3,180 16.13 83.87 100.0 299 12.71 87.29 100.0
2003 3,062 25.80 74.20 100.0 172 20.93 79.07 100.0
2004 2,677 26.04 73.96 100.0 213 28.17 71.83 100.0
Total 25,727 19.58 80.42 100.0 1,323 17.61 82.39 100.0
Notes: aThe population is calculated from the PROFI database. Only firms which are
subsidized in t are considered. Contract research is not included.
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Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Transition
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not subsidized → subsidized (0→1)
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Transition:
subsidized → newly subsidized (1→1)
Predicted probability
in dependence of the number of employees
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Solid line: predicted probability of transition in dependence of the specific variable, all other variables set to their
mean.
Dotted lines: simulated 90% confidence interval for the predicted probability of transition, using 10,000 simulations.
Source: own calculations.
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Table 11: Regression Results for the Sub-sample (Coefficients are shown)
Not subsidized → subsidized Subsidized → newly subsidized
Rare events logit model Logit model
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d)
Continuationt+1 0.287 0.285
Experiencesince t−4 1.061*** 1.047*** 0.354*** 0.353***
Exp EUsince t−2 0.406 0.406 0.487** 0.495***
Exp regionalsince t−2 0.394 0.381 0.019 0.023
Sub supplyt+1 0.041** 0.041** 0.051** 0.052**
Log(Employees) 0.540*** 0.533*** 0.249*** 0.238***
Employees change 0.041 0.048 1.206*** 1.197***
Log(Age) -0.026 -0.029 -0.027 -0.028
R&D occ 0.722* 0.725*
R&D con 1.207*** 1.207*** 0.321 0.315
Qualification 1.519*** 1.511*** 0.742* 0.710*
Patent stock dev 0.006 0.004
Group national -0.396* -0.400* -0.269 -0.266
Group foreign -0.486 -0.480 -0.240 -0.245
East 0.060 0.064 0.601*** 0.603***
Constant -7.997*** -7.955*** -4.482*** -4.427***
No. of obs. 7,560 7,560 938 938
Wald χ2all 182.04*** 191.76*** 100.37*** 100.22***
Log-Likelihood -439.047 -438.951
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.154 0.154
Notes: *** (**,*) indicate significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Unless otherwise specified, the variables refer
to time t. Standard errors are clustered because almost 50% of the firms are more than once in the sample.
Industry and year dummies are not included since they are not jointly significant.
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Table 12: Regression Results for Sub-samples (Coefficients are shown)
Not subsidized → subsidized Subsidized → newly subsidized
Rare even logit model Logit model
Firm sizea Firm location Firm sizea Firm location
Variable Small Medium Large West East Small Medium Large West East
Continuationt+1 0.547 0.159 0.152 0.143 0.654*
Experiencesince t−4 1.359*** 1.430*** 1.012*** 1.265*** 1.202*** 0.309* 0.451*** 0.316*** 0.413*** 0.293***
Exp EUsince t−2 0.779 0.397 0.528 0.740** 0.286 0.348 -0.053 0.686* 0.237 0.386*
Exp regionalsince t−2 0.009 0.840** 0.179 0.756*** 0.059 0.363 0.165 -0.161 0.222 0.239
Sub supplyt+1 0.084* 0.032 0.071** 0.076*** -0.007 0.053 0.005 0.080 0.056** 0.016
Log(Employees) 0.437 0.588*** 0.182 0.560*** 0.439*** 0.570** 0.537*** 0.536** 0.234*** 0.026
Employees change 0.149 0.410 -0.039 0.269 0.073 0.850 0.627 1.111 0.561 1.334**
Log(Age) -0.373** 0.024 -0.009 0.033 -0.174 -0.186 -0.033 0.079 -0.034 -0.094
R&D occ 1.483* 0.716 0.735 0.923* 1.244*
R&D con 1.400* 0.876* 1.469 1.260*** 1.511** 0.857 0.508 -0.070 0.620 0.321
Qualification 1.738*** 1.567*** -0.292 1.160*** 1.071** 0.710 0.810* 1.275 1.118** 0.404
Group national -0.577 -0.163 -0.371 -0.383* -0.071 0.197 -0.153 -0.531 -0.106 0.062
Group foreign -0.832* -0.623 -0.805** -0.274 -0.429 0.366 -0.415 0.208
East -0.017 0.236 0.081 0.616* 0.466* 0.633
Constant -7.439*** -8.436*** -5.387*** -8.588*** -7.077*** -5.885*** -5.904*** -7.432*** -4.648*** -3.024***
No. of obs. 4,292 4,539 1,098 6,603 3,326 423 541 359 891 432
Transition rate 0.68 1.81 5.56 1.76 1.68 20.1 22.0 25.1 19.3 28.2
Wald χ2
all
53.76*** 115.46*** 31.18*** 175.24*** 81.08*** 55.85*** 68.32*** 96.56*** 118.17*** 45.41***
Wald χ2year 29.26*** 25.83***
Log-Likelihood -178.992 -237.772 -154.725 -354.952 -224.630
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.157 0.166 0.235 0.188 0.126
Notes: aSmall firms have 50 employees or less, medium-sized firms between 51 and 500 employees and large firms more than 500 employees. *** (**,*) indicate
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). In the regressions for small firms the foreign variable is excluded since no small firm which is foreign-owned get a newly subsidized
project. Unless otherwise specified, the variables refer to time t. Standard errors are clustered because almost 50% of the firms participate more than once. Year
dummies are included in the regressions if they are jointly significant.
